

# Modal and Temporal Logic

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# Announcements

- ▶ Paper presentation schedule posted on LATTE
  - ▶ Starting 11/21
- ▶ For next Monday
  - ▶ Read van Eijck and Unger Chapter 11
- ▶ For 11/2
  - ▶ HW3 due
- ▶ For 11/9
  - ▶ Final Project Idea due

# Paper Presentation Guidelines

- ▶ Groups should aim for around 20 minutes for summary and analysis, and around 5 minutes for questions and discussion
- ▶ Presentations should cover the following themes
  - ▶ Describe the problem, and why it is interesting/important
    - ▶ What dimensions of meaning are the authors interested in (e.g., expression meaning vs. speaker meaning, meaning as truth vs. meaning as use, etc.)?
  - ▶ How do the authors try to solve the problem?
    - ▶ Methods, data, evaluation, etc.
  - ▶ What are the results and conclusions?
    - ▶ For someone interested in (a) different dimension(s) of meaning than the authors, what lessons can they learn from the paper?

# Final Project

- ▶ In small groups, students will investigate a topic of their choice related to computational semantics, culminating in a short write-up and presentation during finals week
  - ▶ By 11/9, please prepare a short document (one per group, 1/2–1 page or so, in PDF format) containing:

# Final Project

## 1. Names of group members

- ▶ Groups of 2 or 3 preferred
  - ▶ Groups of 1 or 4 also possible, with permission from me
  - ▶ You may (but don't have to) remain in the same groups as for the paper presentations

# Final Project

## 2. Topic you want to investigate

- ▶ Describe the problem, and why it is interesting/important
- ▶ Also try to include at least a little bit of background/related work
- ▶ Possible topics include, but are not limited to
  - ▶ Extensions of things covered in class/the book
  - ▶ Questions that came up when reading a paper (for the paper presentations, or otherwise)
  - ▶ etc.

# Final Project

## 3. How you will investigate it

- ▶ Include methods, data, and evaluation (if applicable)
  - ▶ This can look very different for different projects
- ▶ Projects should involve a “substantial” programming component
  - ▶ Does not have to be in Haskell
  - ▶ If you are unsure if your programming component is “substantial”, ask!

# Final Project

- ▶ Important dates and deadlines
  - ▶ 11/9: Idea due
  - ▶ 12/7: Progress report/“rough draft” due
    - ▶ Don't worry, you don't have to have your project done by then!
  - ▶ 12/14 6-9pm: Presentations (location TBD)
  - ▶ 12/19: Code and write-up due
    - ▶ Expected write-up length: 2–4 pages, single-spaced/formatted according to a style file to be provided



# Final Project

- ▶ Note that we do not expect you to fully solve the problem you are investigating
  - ▶ Toy models, or partial/inconclusive results are good!
  - ▶ The purpose of the final project is to explore a topic you are interested in using the knowledge and skills you've learned during the semester

# Today's Plan

- ▶ Modal Logic
  - ▶ Syntax
  - ▶ Semantics
- ▶ Temporal Logic
  - ▶ Syntax
  - ▶ Semantics

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  - ▶ Semantics
- ▶ (we'll see how far we get...)

# Intensional Constructs

- ▶ “Whether or not a statement is true in some model depends on what is the **actual world** in that model.
  - ▶ The actual world is the world where we evaluate.
- ▶ To check whether a statement is **necessarily true** in an intensional model, we have to check whether it is true in all possible worlds.
- ▶ A statement is **contingently true** if it is true, but it ain't necessarily so: there exists a world where that statement is false.”

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```
iJudgement :: Judgement -> IBool
iJudgement (IsTrue s) = \ i -> iSent s i
iJudgement (IsNec s) = \ i ->
  all (\j -> iSent s j) worlds
iJudgement (IsCont s) = \ i ->
  iSent s i && not (all (\j -> iSent s j) worlds)
```

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  - ▶ etc.

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  - ▶ etc.
- ▶ **Modal logic** is the logic of possible worlds



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# Modal Logic

- ▶ Remember propositional logic?
- ▶ Atomic propositions
  - ▶ Typically indicated by lower case letters  $p$ ,  $q$ ,  $r$ , etc., possibly with indices
  - ▶ Represent the meanings of certain declarative sentences
    - ▶ Specifically, those that cannot be decomposed into other atomic propositions and logical connectives
  - ▶ For example, let:
    - ▶  $p$  be “It rains”
    - ▶  $q$  be “The sun is shining”
    - ▶  $r$  be “There will be a rainbow”

# Modal Logic

- ▶ Formulas of propositional logic
  - ▶ Atomic propositions are formulas
  - ▶ Let  $F_1$  and  $F_2$  be formulas. Then the following are also formulas:
    - ▶ **Negation**:  $\neg F_1$  (“not  $F_1$ ”)
    - ▶ **Conjunction**:  $(F_1 \wedge F_2)$  (“ $F_1$  and  $F_2$ ”)
    - ▶ **Disjunction**:  $(F_1 \vee F_2)$  (“ $F_1$  or  $F_2$ ”)
    - ▶ **Implication** (or **conditional**):  $(F_1 \rightarrow F_2)$  (“if  $F_1$  then  $F_2$ ”)
    - ▶ **Equivalence** (or **biconditional**):  $(F_1 \leftrightarrow F_2)$  (“ $F_1$  if and only if  $F_2$ ”)
- ▶ For example, the sentence “If it rains and the sun is shining, then there will be a rainbow” can be represented as the propositional formula  $(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$

# Modal Logic

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# Modal Logic

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  - ▶ Formulas of propositional logic are formulas of modal logic
  - ▶ Let  $F$  be a formula. Then the following are also formulas:
    - ▶ **Box**:  $\Box F$  (“necessarily  $F$ ”)
    - ▶ **Diamond**:  $\Diamond F$  (“possibly  $F$ ”)

# Semantics of Modal Logic

- ▶ **Definition 5.3** [Huth and Ryan] A model  $\mathcal{M}$  of basic modal logic is specified by three things:
  1. A set  $W$ , whose elements are called **worlds**;
  2. A relation  $R$  on  $W$  ( $R \subseteq W \times W$ ), called the **accessibility relation**;
  3. A function  $L : W \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{Atoms})$ , called the **labelling function**.

We write  $R(x, y)$  to denote that  $(x, y)$  is in  $R$ .


- ▶ “These models are often called **Kripke models**, in honour of S. Kripke who invented them and worked extensively in modal logic in the 1950s and 1960s.”

# Semantics of Modal Logic

- ▶ Huth and Ryan: “Intuitively,  $w \in W$  stands for a possible world and  $R(w, w')$  means that  $w'$  is a world **accessible from** world  $w$ .
  - ▶ The actual nature of that relationship depends on what we intend to model.”
- ▶  $L$  is a function from possible worlds to sets of atomic propositions that are true in those worlds

# Semantics of Modal Logic

- ▶ Graphical notation
  - ▶ “The set  $W$  is drawn as a set of circles, with arrows between them showing the relation  $R$ . Within each circle is the value of the labelling function in that world.”



**Figure 5.3.** A Kripke model.



# Semantics of Modal Logic

- ▶ The truth of an atomic proposition in a **world** is determined by the value of the **labelling function** in the world
- ▶ For other formulas:
  - ▶  $\neg F_1$  is true **in world  $x$**  iff  $F_1$  is false **in  $x$**
  - ▶  $F_1 \wedge F_2$  is true **in world  $x$**  iff  $F_1$  is true and  $F_2$  is true **in  $x$**
  - ▶  $F_1 \vee F_2$  is true **in world  $x$**  iff  $F_1$  is true or  $F_2$  is true **in  $x$**
  - ▶  $F_1 \rightarrow F_2$  is true **in world  $x$**  iff  $F_1$  is false or  $F_2$  is true **in  $x$**
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  - ▶  $\Box F_1$  is true **in world  $x$**  iff for all  $y \in W$  such that  $R(x, y)$ ,  $F_1$  is true **in  $y$**
  - ▶  $\Diamond F_1$  is true **in world  $x$**  iff there exists a  $y \in W$  such that  $R(x, y)$  and  $F_1$  is true **in  $y$**
- ▶ We can write  $x \Vdash F$  when  $F$  is true in world  $x$

# Semantics of Modal Logic

## ► Definition 5.7

1. We say that a set of formulas  $\Gamma$  of basic modal logic **semantically entails** a formula  $\psi$  of basic modal logic if, in any world  $x$  of any model  $\mathcal{M} = (W, R, L)$ , we have  $x \Vdash \psi$  whenever  $x \Vdash \phi$  for all  $\phi \in \Gamma$ . In that case, we say that  $\Gamma \models \psi$  holds.
2. We say that  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  are **semantically equivalent** if  $\phi \models \psi$  and  $\psi \models \phi$  hold. We denote this by  $\phi \equiv \psi$ .

- **Definition 5.8** A formula  $\phi$  of basic modal logic is said to be **valid** if it is true in every world of every model, i.e. iff  $\models \phi$  holds.

# Semantics of Modal Logic




Figure 5.3. A Kripke model.

**Examples 5.6** Consider the Kripke model of Figure 5.3. We have:

- $x_1 \Vdash q$ , since  $q \in L(x_1)$ .
- $x_1 \Vdash \Diamond q$ , for there is a world accessible from  $x_1$  (namely,  $x_2$ ) which satisfies  $q$ . In mathematical notation:  $R(x_1, x_2)$  and  $x_2 \Vdash q$ .
- $x_1 \not\Vdash \Box q$ , however. This is because  $x_1 \Vdash \Box q$  says that all worlds accessible from  $x_1$  (i.e.  $x_2$  and  $x_3$ ) satisfy  $q$ ; but  $x_3$  does not.
- $x_5 \not\Vdash \Box p$  and  $x_5 \not\Vdash \Box q$ . Moreover,  $x_5 \not\Vdash \Box p \vee \Box q$ . However,  $x_5 \Vdash \Box(p \vee q)$ . To see these facts, note that the worlds accessible from  $x_5$  are  $x_4$  and  $x_6$ . Since  $x_4 \not\Vdash p$ , we have  $x_5 \not\Vdash \Box p$ ; and since  $x_6 \not\Vdash q$ , we have  $x_5 \not\Vdash \Box q$ . Therefore, we get that  $x_5 \not\Vdash \Box p \vee \Box q$ . However,  $x_5 \Vdash \Box(p \vee q)$  holds because, in each of  $x_4$  and  $x_6$ , we find  $p$  or  $q$ .
- The worlds which satisfy  $\Box p \rightarrow p$  are  $x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$  and  $x_6$ ; for  $x_2, x_3$  and  $x_6$  this is so since they already satisfy  $p$ ; for  $x_4$  this is true since it does not satisfy  $\Box p$  – we have  $R(x_4, x_5)$  and  $x_5$  does not satisfy  $p$ ; a similar reason applies to  $x_5$ . As for  $x_1$ , it cannot satisfy  $\Box p \rightarrow p$  since it satisfies  $\Box p$  but not  $p$  itself.

# Semantics of Modal Logic

- ▶ “Worlds like  $x_6$  that have no world accessible to them deserve special attention in modal logic.
  - ▶ Observe that  $x_6 \not\models \Diamond\phi$ , no matter what  $\phi$  is, because  $\Diamond\phi$  says ‘there is an accessible world which satisfies  $\phi$ .’ In particular, ‘there is an accessible world,’ which in the case of  $x_6$  there is not.”
    - ▶ Like predicate logic  $\exists$
  - ▶ “No matter what  $\phi$  is, we find that  $x_6 \models \Box\phi$  holds. That is because  $x_6 \models \Box\phi$  says that  $\phi$  is true in all worlds accessible from  $x_6$ . There are no such worlds, so  $\phi$  is vacuously true in all of them: there is simply nothing to check.”
    - ▶ Like predicate logic  $\forall$

# Temporal Logic

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  - ▶ Special case of modal logic
  - ▶ Time indices are represented as possible worlds/states

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- ▶ Two major kinds of temporal logics
  - ▶ “**Linear-time** logics think of time as a set of paths, where a path is a sequence of time instances.”
    - ▶ e.g., **Linear-time Temporal Logic** (LTL), etc.
  - ▶ “**Branching-time** logics represent time as a tree, rooted at the present moment and branching out into the future.”
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- ▶ The logic of HW3 is a linear-time logic with past and future temporal operators



# Temporal Logic


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# Temporal Logic

- ▶ Formulas of HW3 temporal logic
  - ▶ Formulas of propositional logic are formulas of temporal logic
  - ▶ Let  $\phi$  be a formula. Then the following are also formulas:
    - ▶ "H":  $H\phi$  ("at every time in the past,  $\phi$ ")
    - ▶ Past:  $P\phi$  ("at some time in the past,  $\phi$ ")
    - ▶ Future:  $F\phi$  ("at some time in the future,  $\phi$ ")
    - ▶ Global:  $G\phi$  ("at every time in the future,  $\phi$ ")

# Semantics of Temporal Logic

- ▶ A **path** in a model  $\mathcal{M} = (W, R, L)$  is a sequence of worlds  $w_1, w_2, w_3 \dots$  in  $W$  such that, for each  $t \geq 1$ ,  $R(w_t, w_{t+1})$



# Semantics of Temporal Logic

- ▶ The truth of an atomic proposition at a **time** is determined by the value of the **labelling function** at the time
- ▶ For other formulas, **given a path  $w_1, w_2, w_3, \dots$** :
  - ▶  $\neg\phi$  is true **at time  $t$**  iff  $\phi$  is false at  $t$
  - ▶  $\phi \wedge \psi$  is true **at time  $t$**  iff  $\phi$  is true and  $\psi$  is true at  $t$
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  - ▶  $\phi \leftrightarrow \psi$  is true **at time**  $t$  iff  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  have the same truth value at  $t$
  - ▶  $H\phi$  is true **at time**  $t$  iff **for all**  $i < t$ ,  $\phi$  is true at time  $i$
  - ▶  $P\phi$  is true **at time**  $t$  iff **there exists an**  $i < t$  such that  $\phi$  is true at time  $i$
  - ▶  $F\phi$  is true **at time**  $t$  iff **there exists an**  $i \geq t$  such that  $\phi$  is true at time  $i$
  - ▶  $G\phi$  is true **at time**  $t$  iff **for all**  $i \geq t$ ,  $\phi$  is true at time  $i$
- ▶ Notice that the future includes the present!